The National Transportation Safety Board has issued its report on an August 8, 2022, incident by which the 154 foot lengthy U.S. Coast Guard cutter Winslow Griesser (WPC-1116) collided with the 23-foot-long center-console boat Desakata about 4 miles off the northern coast of Puerto Rico. The cutter, with a crew of 21, was transiting westbound alongside the coast, and the boat was transiting northbound whereas trolling (fishing). Of the 2 Desakata crewmembers, one was critically injured, and one was fatally injured. None of the Winslow Griesser crewmembers had been injured. No air pollution was reported. The Desakata, valued at $58,800, was a complete loss.
As we reported earlier, the commander of the cutter was subsequently relieved of duties.
NTSB discovered that as a result of neither vessel’s crew noticed the opposite vessel within the growing crossing state of affairs earlier than the collision, neither had time to evaluate or apply the navigation guidelines to keep away from the collision. The Winslow Griesser ought to have been seen to the Desakata operator earlier than the collision, however the operator was not sustaining a correct lookout. Similarly, the Desakata ought to have been seen to the Winslow Griesser crewmembers earlier than the collision, however the bridge watchstanders weren’t sustaining a correct lookout.
NTSB additionally discovered that the Winslow Griesser commanding officer and officer of the deck didn’t take enough measures to extend situational consciousness when the cutter was transiting at excessive pace.
During the investigation, based mostly on recommendation of their counsel, the Winslow Griesser commanding officer, officer of the deck, and quartermaster of the watch declined requests of NTSB investigators to be interviewed.
NEED FOR USCG TO FIT VDRS
Something that emerges from the report is that the cutter was not geared up with a voyage information recorder (VDR), or its equal. Had it been fitted with a VDR, investigators would have been supplied with extra vital factual details about the collision, which might assist determine potential questions of safety and lead to security enhancements.
The full report goes into extra element on this subject:
“The NTSB has investigated a number of different casualties by which the lack of know-how that might have been offered by a VDR hampered the investigation and prevented higher identification of potential questions of safety. For instance, in its report on the 2008 collision of the passenger ferry Block Island and Coast Guard cutter Morro Bay, the NTSB cited the reliance on restricted data from crew and passenger interviews, digital chart data, and safety digicam video (NTSB 2011). The NTSB’s investigation of the 2010 contact of the passenger ferry Andrew J. Barberi with the terminal construction on the St. George Terminal, Staten Island, New York, additionally was hampered by an absence of VDR data (NTSB 2012).
“Although investigators obtained CCTV video recordings from the bridge, the system couldn’t seize, document, and safeguard necessary detailed information from vessel navigation and management techniques. The NTSB’s report on the 2013 contact of the passenger ferry Seastreak Wall Street with Pier 11 in New York City acknowledged that VDR information would have offered extra full proof concerning a number of vital facets of the casualty (NTSB 2014). For occasion, a VDR might have recorded complete engine, propeller, and steering orders and responses in addition to audio recordings and predominant alarm exercise. These information units would have been central to figuring out the causes of the casualty.
“As a result of these investigations, the NTSB recommended that the Coast Guard require installation of VDRs that meet the IMO’s performance standard for VDRs on new ferry vessels subject to 46 CFR Subchapters H and K (M-14-3), require installation of VDRs that meet the IMO’s performance standard for simplified VDRs on existing ferry vessels subject to 46 CFR Subchapters H and K (M-14-4), and develop a U.S. VDR standard for ferry vessels subject to 46 CFR Subchapter T and require the installation of such equipment where technically feasible (M-14-5). All three of these recommendations are currently classified as Open—Unacceptable Response.”
The NTSB notes that the Coast Guard concluded that the general advantages of VDRs don’t justify the price. The NTSB disagreed with the Coast Guard’s evaluation that the price outweighs the good thing about putting in VDRs as a result of passenger security is crucial side of vessel operation
“While the NTSB’s previous recommendations about VDRs are specifically related to passenger vessels, this collision demonstrates a specific need for VDRs on Coast Guard vessels similar to the Winslow Griesser, a cutter,” says the total NTSB report. “Charged by Congress as the only independent investigator of Coast Guard casualties, the NTSB requires the availability of objective, time-stamped data such as that provided by a VDR to complete timely and thorough investigations that involve Coast Guard cutters. Accurate evidence from multiple sources leads to more-precise findings and targeted conclusions, which enable the NTSB to make more-specific safety recommendations, which, if implemented, have a greater impact on improving vessel safety. Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the U.S. Coast Guard install equipment on all U.S. Coast Guard cutters that records vessel parametric data and audio information that is equivalent to IMO voyage data recorder performance standards.”
RADAR REFLECTORS AND AIS
NTSB additionally discovered that becoming small vessels with tools—akin to radar reflectors or computerized identification techniques—when mixed with correct visible lookout, would enhance the chance for vessels with radar to detect them, subsequently lowering the chance of a collision.
The full report on the cutter collision goes into extra element:
“Small picket and fiberglass vessels are sometimes tough to detect by vessels geared up with radar, notably in the event that they disappear into the trough of every passing swell and the return is intermittent. Although a 1997 Coast Guard security alert emphasised that small boat operators can use radar reflectors to considerably cut back the chance of collision, small fishing vessels such because the Desakata, which was constructed of fiberglass, weren’t required to have radar reflectors, and the Desakata was not outfitted with a radar reflector. The Coast Guard requires radar reflectors for federally documented fishing vessels (with nonmetallic hulls) working past the Boundary Line, amongst others, however not for vessels akin to Desakata. The NTSB has advocated the usage of radar reflectors since 1969, once we beneficial that the Coast Guard discover methods to encourage the usage of radar reflectors. Although radar reflectors are usually not required for small vessels such because the Desakata, the usage of these units enhances security—lowering collision danger by guaranteeing that the vessel is extra seen to radar.
“Similarly, the Desakata was not equipped with AIS, nor was it required. AIS Class B and, more recently, AIS B+ transponders have been developed to provide the safety and navigation benefits of AIS to smaller vessels at lower cost and with simpler installation than the more capable Class A type typically found on ocean-going and larger vessels. Had the Desakata been equipped with an AIS Class B or B+ transponder that was transmitting its location, its position would have been shown on AIS-equipped vessels up to several miles away. It is therefore more likely that the Winslow Griesser bridge watch may have been aware of the boat’s presence nearby in the minutes leading up to the collision if the Winslow Griesser bridge watch had been monitoring radar or AIS before the collision. Regardless, the NTSB encourages recreational and fishing vessels to use radar reflectors and AIS Class B or B+ to improve their detectability.”
PROBABLE CAUSE
Early detection of a vessel is without doubt one of the greatest methods to keep away from collision, says the NTSB. However, becoming a radar reflector or AIS doesn’t cut back the necessity to keep a correct lookout and use all out there sources with the intention to keep away from collision.
The NTSB decided that the possible reason behind the cutter collision with the Desakata was the failure by each vessels’ crews to take care of a correct lookout. Contributing to the casualty was the Winslow Griesser commanding officer and officer of the deck not taking enough measures to extend situational consciousness whereas transiting at a excessive pace.
