An organization’s failure to stick to the 12-hour work restrict set in its Fatigue Management doc is seen because the possible reason for an offshore provide vessel strike on an oil and fuel manufacturing platform, the National Transportation Safety Board says. .
The incident occurred on June 25, 2021 when the offshore provide vessel Elliot Cheramie was on its regular route between Port Fourchon, La., and the oil and fuel manufacturing platform VR-397A within the Gulf of Mexico. On bpard have been the vessel’s crew of 4 and 5 offshore employees. While transiting, the Elliot Cheramie struck oil and fuel manufacturing platform EI-259A. The contact resulted in 4 minor accidents and over $360,000 in damages to the vessel, platform and pipelines.
The Elliot Cheramie’s mate and deckhand have been assigned the in a single day watch (midnight to midday) within the wheelhouse. The mate was steering the vessel in autopilot mode following the GPS monitor.
The mate instructed investigators that he was “more tired than usual” and felt “groggy.” He acknowledged he should have fallen asleep and when he awakened the platform was “dead ahead.” He tried to keep away from it, however the vessel struck the platform.
In the 4 days main as much as the contact, the Elliot Cheramie mate constantly labored for intervals longer than the 12 hours really useful by the corporate’s Fatigue Management doc, says the NTSB. The day earlier than the contact, the mate reported working for 17 hours with a portion of the work requiring excessive ranges of bodily exertion.
Although the deckhand set an alarm to wake himself for the watch, he slept by means of it and was not current within the wheelhouse on the time of contact. The deckhand’s duties would have included helping the mate on the bridge navigation watch; nonetheless, different duties would have taken him away from the wheelhouse for prolonged intervals of time. The firm’s Safety Management System really useful crewmembers be given at the very least 24 hours of discover earlier than starting night time work, however the deckhand was assigned the watch when he arrived onboard, solely 5 hours earlier than.
Based on the work and relaxation histories of the mate, the requirement within the firm’s Vessel Operating Procedures that licensed personnel “may not work for more than 12 hours in a consecutive 24-hour period” was not adopted.
The NTSB decided the possible reason for the contact was the corporate not adhering to its 12-hour work restrict coverage, which led to the fatigued mate falling asleep whereas on watch.
“In this casualty, and as the NTSB has previously noted in numerous commercial vessel casualties, crew fatigue was a significant causal and contributing factor,” the report mentioned. “Company operational policies and requirements should incorporate and follow fatigue management best practices to ensure that crewmembers receive enough rest to adequately perform navigational, lookout, engineering, and other watch stander duties. Additionally, companies should ensure that vessels are crewed with the appropriate number of trained personnel to safely perform operations without compromising work/rest schedules of off-duty watchstanders. Companies and vessel captains should also actively monitor the watch schedules and any off-watch work performed by their crews to ensure that fatigue mitigation policies are adhered to, adjusting watch schedules accordingly for crew members at risk for fatigue.”
Download the total NTSB report
