The Norwegian frigate “KNM Helge Ingstad” handles water after a crash with the vessel “Sola TS” in Oygarden, Norway, November 8, 2018. NTB Scanpix/Marit Hommedal by means of REUTERS

Officials in Norway have actually launched a report having the outcomes of the initial stage of the Accident Investigation Board Norway’s examination right into the crash including the Norwegian frigate Helge Ingstad and also the oil vessel Sola TS outside the Sture incurable in November 2018.

The initial stage of the examination looked for to develop the series of occasions leading up to the crash. Investigators figured out that the event was the outcome of numerous functional, technological, business and also systemic aspects.

The Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN) has actually made a total amount of 15 security referrals as an outcome of the examination.

The HNo MS Helge Ingstad and also the Sola TS clashed in the Hjeltefjord arm in the very early hrs of 8 November 2018 as the Solas TS was leaving the Sture Terminal and also the frigate was southbound with its AIS in“passive mode”

The crash led to considerable damages to the starboard side of the HNo MS Helge Ingstad, creating the frigate to partly sink along the coastline. The Solas TS endured just small problems.

Seven of the frigates team participants received small injuries event. No injuries were received by the team of the Solas TS.

A summary of the incident supplied the AIBN reviews, partially:

The frigate HNo MS Helge Ingstad and also the vessel Sola TS clashed in the Hjeltefjord in the very early hrs of 8 November 2018. The frigate had 137 individuals aboard with a mix of draftees and also irreversible team. An overall of 7 watchstanding workers existed on the bridge, consisting of 2 students. The vessel Sola TS was run by the Greek delivering business Tsakos Columbia Shipmanagement (TCM) S.A. There was a total amount of 24 individuals aboard. The bridge was manned by 4 individuals, consisting of the pilot.

HNo MS Helge Ingstad cruised southern at a rate of around 17– 18 knots with the automated recognition system (AIS) in passive setting, i.e. no transmission of AIS-signal. The frigate’s bridge group had actually alerted Fedje Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) of getting in the location and also complied with the reported trip. Sola TS had actually been filled with petroleum at the Sture Terminal, and also alerted Fedje VTS of separation from the incurable. Sola TS displayed navigating lights. In enhancement several of the deck lights were transformed on to illuminate the deck for the team that were protecting devices etc. for the flow.

In breakthrough of the crash, Fedje VTS had actually not complied with the frigate’s flow southern via theHjeltefjord The team and also pilot on Sola TS had actually observed HNo MS Helge Ingstad and also attempted to advise of the risk and also stop a crash. The team on HNo MS Helge Ingstad did not know that they got on clash till it was far too late.

At 04:01:15, HNo MS Helge Ingstad hit the vessel Sola TS. The initial factor of influence was Sola TS’ starboard support and also the location simply before HNo MS Helge Ingstad’s starboard torpedo publication.

Factors that added to the event, as set out in the AIBN recap, consist of:

• As an effect of the clearance procedure, the profession ladder for fleet policemans in the Navy and also the lack of certified navigators to man the frigates, policemans of the watch had actually been provided clearance quicker, had a reduced degree of experience and also had much less time as police officer of the watch than utilized to be the instance. This had actually likewise led to unskilled policemans of the watch being designated duty for training. Furthermore, a number of elements of the bridge solution were not properly explained or standardised. The evening of the crash, it ended up, to name a few points, that the bridge group on HNo MS Helge Ingstad did not take care of to make use of the group’s human and also technological sources to find, while there was still time, that what they assumed was a fixed item producing the solid lights, as a matter of fact was a vessel on crash training course. Organisation, management and also synergy on the bridge were not profitable throughout the duration leading up to the crash. In mix with the police officer of the watch’s restricted experience, the training being performed for 2 watchstanding features on the bridge decreased the bridge group’s capability to attend to the general website traffic circumstance. Based on a strongly lodged situational understanding that the ‘object’ was fixed which the flow was in control, little usage was constructed from the radar and also AIS to check the fairway.
• When Sola TS established out on its northbound flow with the forward-pointing deck lights switched on, it was hard for the frigate’s bridge group to see the vessel’s navigating lights and also the blinking of the Aldis light, and also therefore determine the ‘object’ as a vessel. The delivering business Tsakos Columbia Shipmanagement SA had actually not developed offsetting precaution when it come to the decrease of the exposure of the navigating lights as a result of deck lights. Furthermore, radar outlining and also interaction on the bridge did not completely guarantee the impact of energetic synergy to construct a typical situational understanding. This can have enhanced the moment home window for recognition and also caution of the frigate.
• The Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA) had actually not developed human, technological and also organisational obstacles to guarantee sufficient website traffic surveillance. The capability of the surveillance system when it come to automated outlining, advising and also alarm system features, was not completely adjusted to the implementation of the vessel website traffic solution. Lack of checking suggested that the VTS driver’s situational understanding and also introduction of the VTS location were insufficient. Hence, Fedje VTS did not offer the vessels included with pertinent and also prompt info and also did not arrange the website traffic to guarantee the vessel’s secure separation from the Sture Terminal.
• On the southbound trip, HNo MS Helge Ingstad cruised with AIS in easy setting. This suggested that the frigate can not be quickly recognized on the displays at Fedje VTS or Sola TS. None of the events included made adequate use readily available technological help. It was a difficulty for maritime security that the Navy can run without AIS transmission and also without offsetting precaution within a web traffic system where the various other gamers mostly utilized AIS as their main (and also somewhat just) resource of info.

The 15 security referrals sent by the AIBN are listed below:

Safety suggestion MARINE No 2019/05T

On the southbound trip in the very early hrs of 8 November 2018, training was being performed for 2 watchstanding features on the bridge of HNo MSHelge Ingstad The training task suggested that the bridge group’s capability to attend to the general website traffic circumstance was decreased. The Navy did not have skills demands for teachers and also treatments to guarantee the performance of the bridge group while providing training.

The Accident Investigation Board Norway advises that the Royal Norwegian Navy develop skills demands and also treatments for training task on the bridge, taking care of both the training feature and also secure navigating.

Safety suggestion MARINE No 2019/06T

On the southbound flow via the Hjeltefjord in the very early hrs of 8 November 2018, while training task was being performed on the bridge of HNo MS Helge Ingstad, the navigator accountable did not notice the signals of risk or that the navigator’s very own situational understanding was incorrect. An even more seasoned navigator would certainly have been far better geared up to know this. As an effect of the clearance procedure, the profession ladder for fleet policemans in the Navy and also the lack of certified navigators to man the frigates, policemans of the watch had actually been provided clearance quicker, had a reduced degree of experience and also had much less time as police officer of the watch than utilized to be the instance.

The Accident Investigation Board Norway advises that the Royal Norwegian Navy take into consideration the profession course and also the clearance procedure for policemans in the Fleet in regard to the Navy’s manning principle for frigates, for making sure that bridge groups have an adequate degree of skills and also experience.

Safety suggestion MARINE No 2019/07T

On the southbound flow via the Hjeltefjord in the very early hrs of 8 November 2018, an extra collaborated bridge group on HNo MS Helge Ingstad would certainly have been extra with the ability of discovering the vessel quicker. Achieving excellent bridge source monitoring (BRM) is especially difficult when it comes to bridge groups whose participants are regularly being changed.

The Accident Investigation Board Norway advises that the Royal Norwegian Navy develop organized bridge source monitoring (BRM) training for the entire bridge group.

Safety suggestion MARINE No 2019/08T

On the southbound flow via the Hjeltefjord in the very early hrs of 8 November 2018, the vessel was not found in time to stay clear of the crash. Organisation, management and also synergy on the bridge of HNo MS Helge Ingstad were not profitable. In enhancement, the regulating bridge solution files (the bridge handbook) supplied not enough task assistance when it come to run the risk of evaluation and also making sure a secure trip.

The Accident Investigation Board Norway advises that the Royal Norwegian Navy evaluation and also change the regulating bridge solution files.

Safety suggestion MARINE No 2019/09T

The examination of the crash in the Hjeltefjord in the very early hrs of 8 November 2018, has actually located that the workers on the bridge on HNo MS Helge Ingstad was not properly created when it come to the demands for vision in existing laws. Medical physical fitness evaluation and also follow-up is suggested to guarantee that every person that offers in a provided setting, is clinically fit to carry out such solution securely and also successfully.

The Accident Investigation Board Norway advises that the Royal Norwegian Navy evaluation and also enhance its system for clinical physical fitness evaluation and also follow-up when it come to vision.

Safety suggestion MARINE No 2019/10T

On the southbound flow via the Hjeltefjord in the very early hrs of 8 November 2018, HNo MS Helge Ingstad cruised with AIS in easy setting. This suggested that the vessel can not be quickly recognized on the displays at Fedje VTS and also Sola TS. It was a difficulty for maritime security that the Navy had the ability to run without AIS transmission and also without offsetting precaution within a web traffic system where the various other gamers mostly utilized AIS as their main resource of info.

The Accident Investigation Board Norway advises that the Royal Norwegian Navy assess making use of AIS and also guarantee that sufficient offsetting procedures are established when utilizing AIS in passive or encrypted setting.

Safety suggestion MARINE No 2019/11T

If HNo MS Helge Ingstad had actually established AIS to setting 3 (Warship AIS) for the trip in the very early hrs of 8 November 2018, it’s extremely most likely that the VTS surveillance system would certainly have shown the AIS info. The examination has actually located that the discussion in between the NCA and also the Navy regarding making use of W-AIS in the Fedje VTS location, vanished prior to standards for such usage remained in location. The AIBN takes into consideration use W-AIS in VTS locations to possibly be a beneficial security obstacle in circumstances where use AIS setting 1 is not proper.

The Accident Investigation Board Norway advises that the Royal Norwegian Navy, together with the Norwegian Coastal Administration, return to and also formalise their cooperation to create and also apply standards for making use of Warship AIS in the Fedje VTS location, along with in various other Norwegian VTS locations as needed.

Safety suggestion MARINE No 2019/12T

On the southbound flow via the Hjeltefjord in the very early hrs of 8 November 2018, HNo MS Helge Ingstad cruised with AIS in easy setting. This suggested that the vessel can not be quickly recognized on the displays at Fedje VTS or the screens on Sola TS. When functional needs caused a modification of method to even more use AIS in easy setting, the appropriate guidelines in the navigating demands were alloted.

The Accident Investigation Board Norway advises that the Royal Norwegian Navy assess the operating principle and also guarantee that security monitoring and also functional requirements are contrasted as monitoring specifications.

Safety suggestion MARINE No 2019/13T

The accessibility to valid info in order to map the series of occasions in the crash in the Hjeltefjord in the very early hrs of 8 November 2018, has actually been rather restricted by the absence of Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) aboard HNo MSHelge Ingstad Had VDR information from HNo MS Helge Ingstad been readily available, the AIBN would certainly have had accessibility to distinct information to record the series of occasions extra precisely, and also to much better comprehend the circumstance aboard the frigate.

The Accident Investigation Board Norway advises that the Royal Norwegian Navy mount VDR on the Navy’s vessels.

Safety suggestion MARINE No 2019/14T

The examination of the crash in the Hjeltefjord in the very early hrs of 8 November 2018, has actually located that the bridge group on HNo MS Helge Ingstad might have been rather impacted by tiredness, especially thinking about the moment of day. In the lack of organized logging of functioning hrs and also hrs of remainder etc., it has actually not been feasible to even more explore the level to which the bridge group might have been impacted by tiredness. The Ministry of Defence has actually launched the procedure of developing safety arrangements for sea-going workers in the Navy.

The Accident Investigation Board Norway advises that the Ministry of Defence present, especially associating with crucial features, a system to offer the Navy an organized introduction and also favorable control of hrs of remainder. In enhancement, a need for offsetting procedures must be established when non-compliance with the given hrs of remainder in the private safety arrangement.

Safety suggestion MARINE No 2019/15T

When leaving the Sture Terminal in the very early hrs of 8 November 2018, Sola TS had the forward-pointing deck lights transformed on to illuminate the deck for the team that were protecting devices etc. for the flow. The deck lights decreased the exposure of both the navigating lights and also the flashes from the Aldis light. This added to the bridge group on HNo MS Helge Ingstad not handling to aesthetically determine Sola TS as a vessel.

The Accident Investigation Board Norway advises that the delivery business Tsakos Columbia Shipmanagement S.A. develop precaution for making use of deck lights on vessels, which guarantees that the deck lights do not decrease the exposure of the navigating lights.

Safety suggestion MARINE No 2019/16T

During the trip from the Sture Terminal in the very early hrs of 8 November 2018, neither HNo MS Helge Ingstad neither any type of various other vessels were outlined on the radar on Sola TS. Furthermore, there was little interaction in between the bridge group and also the pilot regarding the trip and also the basic website traffic circumstance in the fairway. This suggested that the impact of energetic synergy to construct a typical situational understanding was not completely ensured.

The Accident Investigation Board Norway advises that the delivery business Tsakos Columbia Shipmanagement S.A. evaluation and also enhance its method associating with collaboration on the bridge and also secure navigating on vessels under pilotage.

Safety suggestion MARINE No 2019/17T

The examination of the crash in the Hjeltefjord in the very early hrs of 8 November 2018, has actually located that Sola TS’ deck lights decreased the exposure of both the navigating lights and also the flashes from the Aldis light. This added to the bridge group on HNo MS Helge Ingstad not handling to aesthetically determine Sola TS as a vessel. It is a recognized truth and also regular method that the vessels on their means to the incurable demand to begin planning for mooring and also loading, which the vessels on their escape get ready for the ocean-going trip.

The Accident Investigation Board Norway advises that the Norwegian Maritime Authority attend to the sector generally when it come to making use of deck lights which can decrease the exposure of the vessel’s navigating lights.

Safety suggestion MARINE No 2019/18T

In the very early hrs of 8 November 2018, the VTS centre did not check the southbound trip of HNo MS Helge Ingstad via theHjeltefjord The NCA had actually not developed human, technological and also organisational obstacles to guarantee sufficient website traffic surveillance. The capability of the surveillance system when it come to automated outlining, advising and also alarm system features, was not adjusted to the implementation of the vessel website traffic solution.

The Accident Investigation Board Norway advises that the Norwegian Coastal Administration evaluation and also enhance exactly how website traffic surveillance is performed, when it come to manning, jobs and also technological help.

Safety suggestion MARINE No 2019/19T

In the very early hrs of 8 November 2018, Fedje VTS did not properly educate various other website traffic in the location of Sola TS leaving theSture Terminal An reliable and also proper info solution is a vital payment to situational understanding for all vessels when vessels run within the VTS location. Due to the absence of website traffic info the frigate’s bridge group missed out on a possibility to sign up that a vessel was leaving the Sture incurable.

The Accident Investigation Board Norway advises that the Norwegian Coastal Administration evaluation and also enhance its treatments and also method for website traffic info.

Download the Report: Part one report on the collision on 8 November 2018 between the frigate HNoMS Helge Ingstad and the oil tanker Sola TS outside the Sture Terminal in the Hjeltefjord in Hordaland county