The Accident Investigation Board of Norway (AIBN) launched Thursday its preliminary report on its examination right into the November 8 accident including the Norwegian frigate ‘KNM Helge Ingstad’ and also a filled industrial oil vessel Sola TS near the Sture incurable in Hjeltefjorden, Norway.

The accident led to substantial damages to the frigate, bring about the deserting of the ship and also its sinking near coast. Only small damages was suffered by the vessel.

There were no severe injuries amongst the 137 seafarers aboard the frigate and also 23 crewmembers of the Sola TS.

The AIBN states the objective of the initial record is to interact details acquired so far in the on-going examination, offer a short upgrade on just how the examination is proceeding, and also use an initial summary of the series of occasions and also safety-critical problems recognized at this phase.

The AIBN’s examination will certainly not appoint blame and/or obligation under criminal or civil regulation, however it will certainly identify whether there is a demand to recommend security suggestions for the objective of enhancing security mixed-up, consisting of from the militaries viewpoint.

The AIBN has actually made 2 acting security suggestion associating with the frigate’s leak-proof areas.

According to the AIBN, the first examination has actually concentrated on developing an initial summary of the series of occasions, and also mapping what happened aboard ‘KNM Helge Ingstad’ and also ‘Sola TS’ up till the moment of the mishap at 04:01, consisting of the vessels’ interaction with Fedje Vessel Traffic Services (VTS).

The record’s initial summary of the series of occasions leading up to the event are uploaded completely listed below:

On Thursday 8 November 2018, the frigate ‘KNM Helge Ingstad’ got on a south training course in inshore waters north ofBergen Navigation training was being carried out customarily throughout a transportation trip. Before the vessel went into Fedje VTS’s solution location, the staff informed that they would certainly get in the location from the north and also specified their intended path. This was logged by Fedje VTS at 02:40. During the southbound trip at a rate of regarding 17– 18 knots, the AIS aboard ‘KNM Helge Ingstad’ was readied to receiver setting (invoice just, no transmission of very own information), the vessel’s navigating lights were lit and also the vessel might be observed by radar. ‘KNM Helge Ingstad’ developed a paying attention watch on VHF network 80, the VTS’s functioning regularity for the location.

Shortly prior to 03:00, a pilot from the Norwegian Coastal Administration boarded the Malta- signed up vessel ‘Sola TS’, which had actually been filled with petroleum at the Sture incurable and also was preparing to leave. Two tugboats got here not long after, to aid throughout the separation from the incurable.

At 03:13, the pilot on ‘Sola TS’ called Fedje VTS with the message that they were beginning to unmoor and also getting ready for separation. The VTS validated invoice of the details. Around that time, there were 3 various other northbound vessels in the location south of the Sture incurable.

At around 03:40, the navigating policeman beginning watch got here on the bridge of ‘KNM Helge Ingstad’, experienced the handover treatment and also was notified regarding vessel website traffic in the waters by the policeman leaving the watch. The 3 northbound vessels were signed up and also outlined on the radar aboard‘KNM Helge Ingstad’ During the watch handover, an item with lots of lights was observed existing still simply outside the Sture incurable.

At about 03:45, the pilot on ‘Sola TS’ informed Fedje VTS that the vessel was leaving from the Sture incurable and also heading west out Fedjeosen.

At about 03:55, the policeman beginning watch on ‘KNM Helge Ingstad’ took control of the watch, and also the previous policeman of the watch left the bridge.

Assisted by the 2 tugboats, the vessel ‘Sola TS’ began to relocate far from the quay at the Sture incurable. The vessel lay with its starboard side to the quay and also the bow aiming southern. When ‘Sola TS’ was completely much from the quay, the vessel was looked to port to establish the training course at 350 °, in the direction ofFedjeosen As ‘Sola TS’ was leaving the Sture incurable, 3 vessels come close to southern, at starboard quarter of the vessel, as it had actually currently transformed and also established a northward training course. When ‘Sola TS’ left the quay, its navigating lights and also deck lights were lit.

At about 03:57 the pilot observed the resemble of a southbound vessel on the radar. The vessel was north of‘Sola TS’ The pilot saw the vessel’s thumbs-up which it would certainly cross his training course line, however did not have an AIS signal for the vessel.

At 03:58, the pilot called Fedje VTS and also requested the name of the vessel that was heading in the direction of the vessel on the port bow. The VTS responded to that they had no details regarding this vessel. The pilot and also captain on ‘Sola TS’ after that attempted to speak to the vessel in various other means. They blinked the Aldis light, and also the pilot asked for a 10-degree training course modification to 000 ° from the captain on ‘Sola TS’.

At about 04:00, Fedje VTS called ‘Sola TS’ with the details that the vessel was potentially‘KNM Helge Ingstad’ Shortly afterwards, the pilot called ‘KNM Helge Ingstad’ and also requested it to count on starboard instantly. The bridge staff on ‘KNM Helge Ingstad’ responded that they might not count on starboard prior to they had actually passed the item they saw on their starboard side.

Just after 04:00, ‘KNM Helge Ingstad’ was about 400 m from Sola TS. When ‘KNM Helge Ingstad’ did not transform training course, both the pilot and also Fedje VTS called ‘KNM Helge Ingstad’ asking for the vessel to act. Shortly afterwards, ‘KNM Helge Ingstad’ accomplished an evasion maneuver, however it was far too late, and also both vessels clashed.

‘KNM Helge Ingstad’ continual significant damages in the accident. Control of the tail and also propulsion was shed. This triggered the vessel to proceed unchecked in the direction of the coast, where it based at 04:11, about 10 mins after the accident. As the vessel filled with water, its security and also buoyancy worn-out and also ‘KNM Helge Ingstad’ was left.

The record takes place to offer an initial evaluations, which is uploaded partly listed below:

It was a clear evening when ‘KNM Helge Ingstad’ cruised southwards along Hjeltefjorden, and also the lights from the Sture incurable have to have shown up from afar. When the incurable very first came to be noticeable from ‘KNM Helge Ingstad’, ‘Sola TS’ was together with at the incurable. Because the staff on ‘Sola TS’ were getting ready for separation, the deck of the vessel was well-lit. At a range it would certainly be tough to divide the lights on the vessel from the lights at the incurable. Also, the lights did stagnate as the vessel was still together with quay. It is very likely that both these elements provided the staff on ‘KNM Helge Ingstad’ the impact beforehand that the lights came from a fixed item.

After the watch modification at around 03:40– 03:45, this was the basis for the bridge staff’s understanding of the circumstance. Even though ‘Sola TS’ left the quay at around that time, there remained to be little family member motion of the lights as the vessel transformed from a south to a northward training course. The vessel’s use deck lights after separation likewise suggested that the staff on ‘KNM Helge Ingstad’ were not able to identify the navigating lights on ‘Sola TS’.

When ‘KNM Helge Ingstad’ at about 04:00 specified that they might not count on starboard, it was based upon an ongoing assumption of the lights as being fixed which a resort to starboard would certainly send them directly right into the lit item. They likewise thought that they were interacting with among the 3 northbound vessels that they were checking on the radar. It was not up until following this that the staff on ‘KNM Helge Ingstad’ realised that they got on clash, at which time it was difficult to prevent a crash.

The AIBN’s initial evaluation is that the mishap was not triggered by any type of solitary act or occasion, however can be clarified by a collection of engaging complicated elements and also situations. The examination group is looking for to determine and also recognize these elements. So much, the AIBN has actually not seen any type of indicator of technological systems not functioning as planned up till the moment of the accident.

As constantly we urge you to review the AIBN’s initial record completely. It can be located at the web links listed below:

• AIBN: Investigation of marine accident, collision outside the Sture Oil Terminal in Hjeltefjorden, Norway