![NTSB: Severe winds led to deadly capsizing of SEACOR Power Capsized SEACOR Power on the evening of the accident, with a Coast Guard response boat in the foreground. [U.S. Coast Guard photograph]](https://www.marinelog.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/SEAOR_Power.jpg)
Capsized SEACOR Power on the night of the accident, with a Coast Guard response boat within the foreground. [U.S. Coast Guard photograph]
Severe winds throughout a thunderstorm led to a lack of stability and finally the capsizing of the liftboat SEACOR Power, the National Transportation Safety Board stated Tuesday throughout a public board assembly. Of the 19 individuals aboard the vessel, six died and 7 are lacking, presumed useless. Six individuals had been rescued by the U.S. Coast Guard and other vessels. The SEACOR Power, valued at $25 million, was a complete loss.
On April 13, 2021, the vessel, a liftboat supporting offshore work on oil-producing platforms, capsized off the coast of Port Fourchon, La. Vessel operators reported heavy rain, winds exceeding 80 knots and 2- to 4-foot seas on the time of the capsizing.
The SEACOR Power was destined for an oil and fuel lease block within the Gulf of Mexico and obtained underway shortly after midday. Sometime after 3 p.m., the liftboat was overtaken by a rain squall. The vessel’s mate stated a second squall about 10 minutes later brought on “white out” circumstances. The crew started to decrease the vessel’s 265-foot-long legs to the seafloor to permit the vessel to experience out the storm. During the leg-lowering course of, the mate turned the SEACOR Power into the wind to sluggish its pace. As the vessel turned, it heeled over and capsized at round 3:57 p.m.
A National Weather Service report concluded the realm of the capsizing was affected by an “unusually intense thunderstorm wind event.”
The NTSB decided the possible reason for the capsizing was a lack of stability that occurred when the vessel was struck by extreme thunderstorm winds, which exceeded the vessel’s operational wind pace limits. Contributing to the lack of life on the vessel had been the pace at which the vessel capsized and the angle at which it got here to relaxation, which made egress tough and the excessive winds and seas within the aftermath of the capsizing, which hampered rescue efforts.
NTSB investigators recognized information gaps that prevented the National Weather Service from figuring out and forecasting the floor wind magnitudes that the SEACOR Power encountered. The localized wind circumstances couldn’t be detected by climate service radars on account of their elevation angles.
The remaining report will probably be printed on the NTSB web site in a number of weeks, nonetheless, the manager abstract, possible trigger, findings, and security suggestions are within the report summary out there on the investigation net web page.
“We found that the captain’s decision to get underway on the day of the casualty was reasonable and was not influenced by commercial pressure. However, weather information that SEACOR Marine provided to the SEACORPower’s crew was insufficient for making weather-related decisions about the liftboat’s operation,” says the report summary. “Additionally, on account of a Coast Guard broadcasting station outage, the SEACOR Power crew didn’t obtain a National Weather Service Special Marine Warning notifying mariners of a extreme thunderstorm that was approaching.
“Even if the SEACOR Power crew had acquired the Special Marine Warning, information gaps, together with an absence of low-altitude radar visibility over the Louisiana coastal areas, prevented the National Weather Service workplace that issued the Special Marine Warning from figuring out and forecasting the floor wind magnitudes that impacted the SEACOR Power. Lowering the angle of the bottom radar beam at choose coastal climate radar websites would enhance low-altitude radar visibility over coastal waters.
“The capsizing occurred when the SEACOR Power was struck by extreme thunderstorm- generated winds that exceeded the vessel’s operational wind pace limits, inflicting a lack of stability. Other operational elements could have additionally performed a task within the capsizing, together with the liftboat’s trim by the strict (the distinction between a ship’s ahead and aft drafts), its flip to port and pace by way of the water, a cargo shift, and motion of the vessel’s legs.
“We discovered that as a result of unpredictability of thunderstorm phenomena and the vulnerability of restricted-service liftboats just like the SEACOR Power, working restricted- service liftboats just like the SEACOR Power within the afloat mode at any time when a Special Marine Warning has been issued for the vessel’s deliberate route will increase their threat of capsizing. Further, growing minimal stability standards for liftboats in restricted service would enhance vessel survivability in extreme thunderstorms.
“The speed at which the SEACOR Power capsized and angle at which it came to rest made egress difficult and likely contributed to the fatalities. Following the capsizing, the Coast Guard Response Command Center did not effectively use available information to verify the validity of the location of SEACOR Power’s emergency position indicating radio beacon alerts, which led to a delay in dispatching search and rescue units and notifying Good Samaritan vessels of the emergency. Additionally, SEACOR Marine did not have adequate procedures nor did it provide its staff with training for responding to the Coast Guard when contacted regarding emergency position indicating radio beacon alerts, and inaccurate information about the SEACOR Power’s location provided to the Coast Guard by a SEACOR Marine employee contributed to the delayed response.”
RECOMMENDATIONS
As a end result, the NTSB really useful the National Weather Service, Federal Aviation Administration, and the Air Force work collectively to evaluate coastal climate radar websites to find out whether it is secure and applicable to decrease radar angles, which may enhance the power to precisely forecast climate circumstances.
The NTSB issued three security suggestions to the U.S. Coast Guard:
- develop procedures to tell mariners in affected areas every time there’s an outage at a navigational telex broadcasting website;
- modify restricted-service liftboat stability laws to require higher stability for newly constructed restricted-service liftboats; and
- develop procedures to combine industrial, municipal, and non-profit air rescue suppliers into Sectors’ and Districts’ mass rescue operations plans.
The NTSB additionally reiterated a suggestion to the U.S. Coast Guard to require all personnel employed on vessels in coastal, Great Lakes and ocean service be supplied with a private locator beacon. The NTSB additionally really useful the Offshore Marine Service Association notify members of non-public locator beacons’ availability and worth.
“We’ve been waiting five years for the Coast Guard to implement our recommendation on personal locator beacons — a call to action we’re renewing today for the fourth time,” stated NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy. “Mariners’ safety can’t wait, which is why I’m urging employers to invest in personal locator beacons for their crew. As the SEACOR Power tragedy shows, the lifesaving promise of these devices cannot be overstated.”
The first time the NTSB really useful the Coast Guard require private locator beacons was following the 2015 sinking of the cargo vessel El Faro during which all 33 crewmembers perished. NTSB reiterated the advice for the primary time after the fishing vessel Scandies Rose sank off Sutwik Island, Alaska, in 2019, which killed 5 individuals; and once more following the 2020 sinking of the Emmy Rose fishing vessel off the coast of Massachusetts, which killed all 4 crewmembers.
“None of the people aboard the El Faro, the Scandies Rose, the Emmy Rose, or the SEACOR Power had personal locator beacons. If they did, perhaps more of them would be with us today,” Homendy stated. “Instead, 55 people died or were unrecovered in these tragedies — 55 people gone forever.”