LH2 service Suiso Frontier at Kawasaki Heavy Industries [Image: Hunini]
The Australian Transport Safety Board has now issued a report on a January 25, 2022 incident wherein a gasoline flame briefly propagating onto the deck of the world’s first liquified hydrogen tanker, Suiso Frontier, whereas the ship was berthed within the Port of Hastings, Victoria.
Although the flame didn’t lead to a hearth or explosion, flames and hydrogen aren’t an excellent mixture, so the ATSB report is prone to to obtain numerous consideration as plans develop for big scale hydrogen transportation.
The ATSB discovered that the propagation of the flame from the LH2 service’s vent stack was as a result of failure of an incorrectly-fitted electrical solenoid valve.
The Suiso Frontier, constructed as a prototype ship to evaluate the technical features of transporting LH2 by sea, had arrived on the Port of Hastings, Victoria on January 20, 2022, on its maiden voyage.
The 116 meter LH2 service had departed Kobe, Japan, on December 25, 2021, with 55 tonnes of LH2, and was to load further LH2 from the gasoline liquefaction facility at Hastings earlier than returning to Kobe.
After LH2 had been loaded at Hastings on January 24, 2022, the ship was nonetheless berthed on the night of January 25 when the malfunction occurred because the ship’s chief mate and cargo engineer made plans to begin the ship’s gasoline combustion unit or GCU to burn extra boil-off gasoline from the LH2 cargo tan
A employee on board the ship noticed a yellow gasoline flame briefly propagate from the gasoline combustion unit’s vent stack on the ship’s deck. There was no subsequent fireplace or explosion, and no accidents or injury have been reported.
An ATSB investigation discovered the gasoline combustion unit’s air fan discharge damper actuators – which regulate the movement of air into the unit – have been fitted with direct present (DC) electrical solenoid valves, which have been incompatible with the 230 V alternating present (AC) provide from the GCU management system.
“During roughly 400 hours of service prior to the occurrence, the solenoid valves were subjected to conditions for which they were not designed,” ATSB Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell mentioned. “When one of these solenoid valves failed, the fan discharge damper it was operating closed. Consequently, the temperature of the gas combustion unit increased, eventually resulting in the discharge of flame from the unit’s vent stack.”
In addition to the inaccurate solenoid valve being fitted, the ATSB discovered the gasoline combustion unit was not outfitted to detect the failure of the valve, nor the next closing of the damper.
“Automated safety controls intended to detect a malfunction to prevent such an incident were not effective,” Chief Commissioner Mitchell mentioned.
In response to the incident, the producer of the gasoline combustion unit, Saacke, fitted restrict switches on every air fan discharge damper to watch damper place.
In addition, the system’s management logic has been programmed to cease the unit if a fault is detected.
“The ATSB’s investigation highlights the importance of ensuring automated shipboard operating systems are equipped with safety controls to prevent hazardous consequences in the event of a malfunction,” the Chief Commissioner mentioned. “The incident also shows the importance of stringent manufacturer quality controls to ensure correct system components are specified and fitted to equipment.”
