Image: Brazilian Navy
The master’s choice to differ the intended path was amongst the causal consider what an examination performed by the Republic of the Marshall Islands Maritime Administrator recognizes as a “very serious” aquatic casualty: the February 2020 grounding of the Polaris Shipping Company huge ore provider Stellar Polaris.
The 300,660 dwt Marshall Islands signed up vessel called all-time low after leaving from Ponta da Madeira, Brazil, on February 24, 2020, stuffed with 294,871 tonnes of iron ore. The ship’s hull was harmed, causing flooding of several gaps and water ballast containers.
“The ship anchored while the crewmembers assessed the damage and attempted to control the flooding using fixed and portable pumps,” claims the examination record. “After several hours, it was determined that sea water was flooding the damaged voids and tanks faster than the fixed and portable pumps could pump it out. Based on this assessment, the master moved Stellar Banner to shallower water and intentionally grounded the ship on the morning of February 25 2020.”
Subsequently salvors eliminated 3,500 tonnes of gas oil and 140 tonnes of gasoline that had actually gotten on board the ship. They after that started lightering the ship’s freight. By May 27, 2020, regarding 145,000 tonnes of freight had actually been lightered and the ship was refloated. The ship was instantly lugged and reanchored in much deeper water, where a damages study was performed. Based on the searchings for. it was figured out that Stellar Banner was a positive failure.
On June 12, 2020, Stellar Banner was scuttled with the staying freight aboard roughly 55-60 maritime miles northeast of the entry to the Ba ía de São Marcos method network in greater than 2,700 meters of water. All unsafe products had actually formerly been gotten rid of from the ship prior to it was scuttled.
The aquatic security examination performed by the Republic of the Marshall Islands recognized that causal aspects that added to the casualty consisted of the master’s choices to differ the intended path throughout the outgoing transportation of Ba ía de São Marcos and pass within 1 maritime miles of a 20 meter shoal based upon minimal hydrographic details offered on the graph.
The record likewise recognized inefficient bridge source administration (BRM) throughout the ship’s outgoing transportation of Ba ía de São Marcos and keeps in mind that “the company’s navigation watchstanding procedures did not provide clear expectations and guidance regarding the use of BRM by members of the ship’s bridge team when the master has the conn.”
