J.W. Herron post-fire at Three Mile Dry Dock as well as Repair Source: NTSB
The National Transportation Safety Board has actually provided a record on a December 2017 engine space fire that required the team of a 1967-built towing vessel to leave the vessel, which sustained an approximated $1.5 million in damages.
The case took place at regarding 1340 neighborhood time on December 13, 2017, when the hauling vessel J.W. Herron, had by Graestone Logistics, LLC as well as run by Four Rivers Towing, LLC. was moving barges on Big Bayou Canot near Twelvemile Island, around 8 miles north of Mobile,Alabama A fire started in the reduced engine space as well as promptly spread out. After the team of 3 partly protected the engines as well as gas supply, hefty smoke as well as fire stopped them from trying to snuff out the fire, compeling an instant emptying of the vessel to the barges. No air pollution or injuries were reported.
There’s a lot more in the complete NTSB mishap short than in the barebones exec recap, consisting of the truth that alcohol and drug examinations provided to the team caused the designer screening favorable for methamphetamine.
“An NTSB medical evaluation determined that the engineer’s results showed that at some point during the several hours to days prior to the test, the engineer had used methamphetamine, for which the engineer did not provide a valid prescription,” states the NTSB short. “However, the assessment kept in mind that pee screening can not figure out specifically when an individual utilized the medicine, the timing of problems from its usage, or the level of problems.
“Although there was no proof of the designer, that checked favorable for methamphetamine, suffering in habits or decision-making capacity on the early morning of the mishap, any kind of substance abuse by a crewmember positions a security threat while aboard a vessel.
The NTSB short notes that “a day after the fire, a commercial forensic science firm contracted by the vessel’s insurer conducted an examination of the J.W. Herron to ascertain the source of the fire. The firm’s report classified the fire as accidental and noted that fire patterns indicated that damage to the starboard engine was more extensive than to the port engine, whose valve covers remained intact while the starboard’s were melted. The clutch tires for each engine were found to be equally damaged. A vacuum canister for the engine’s crankcase oil, which was located above the clutch tire area, had connecting hoses burned away at both engines. The firm concluded that the fire occurred near the aft end of the starboard engine, likely from a ruptured hose on the vacuum canister that would have sprayed lube oil throughout the engine compartment and onto hot engine surfaces and the clutch tire, thus igniting the oil. Once the oil ignited, the fire would have spread by burning combustible materials as well as diesel fuel and lube oil systems in the engine compartment, before reaching the upper level via direct flame impingement and conduction. The report also noted that heat buildup from the slipping clutch, which was described by the captain, rendered the clutch tire a potential ignition source.”
Probable Cause
The National Transportation Safety Board figures out that the possible reason for the engine space fire aboard the hauling vessel J.W. Herron was dripping lube oil from a propulsion diesel motor pipe or tubes suitable that was stired up off a revealed warm engine surface area or sliding clutch. Contributing to the extent of the fire was the area of the emergency situation engine closures as well as gas supply shutoffs near the outside engine space doors, which confirmed to be hard to reach. Contributing to the spread of the fire was the lack of ability to protect air flow to the engine space.
Accessing Remote Engine Room Shutdowns
“The location of remote emergency shutdowns to the engine room—quick-closing valves for fuel and lube oil systems, remote stops for ventilation fans, and engine stops—as well as fire pump start controls may not be accessible during a fire,” states the NTSBBrief “Therefore, the accessibility of these shutdowns and controls should be evaluated during fire-response planning. Alternative remote emergency shutdown locations, such as the wheelhouse, should be considered for redundancy.”
Download the NTSB Marine Accident Brief HERE
