Australia’s nationwide transportation safety and security detective is calling out insufficient global vessel fire safety and security criteria and also policies following a 2018 mass service provider fire that took 5 days to consist of and also snuff out.
The 202 meter, Australian flagged self-unloading mass service provider Iron Chieftain was releasing its freight of dolomite at Port Kembla, New South Wales in the very early hrs of June 18, 2018 when rubbing, possibly from an unsuccessful bearing, produced sufficient warm to stir up a rubber conveyor belt in the C-Loop interior freight dealing with room. (Self- dumping bulk service providers are geared up with a collection of conveyor belt systems and also rooms that allow freight to be unloaded without calling for shore-based tools.)
During a normal safety and security round of the self-unloading system throughout freight discharge procedures, a team participant spotted an odd scent and also white smoke that quickly altered to black as the staff participant came close to the deck casing door for the C-loop room.
The ship’s staff after that started an emergency situation action yet shipboard initiatives to regulate the fire verified inadequate, with the fire quickly developing itself and also infecting the outside of the ship, establishing the discharge boom alight. The ship’s staff were ultimately left and also Fire and also Rescue New South Wales (FRNSW) firemans organized the action to the fire. The fire was included and also ultimately snuffed out concerning 5 days later on.
(Image: ATSB)
The fire triggered considerable architectural damages consisting of violations of 2 gas oil containers, and also a lot of the self-unloading system was damaged. The ship was ultimately considered uneconomic to fix and also proclaimed a positive failure prior to it was hauled to Turkey for reusing. However, there were no significant injuries or aquatic contamination reported as an outcome of the fire.
The case highlights an absence of appropriate regulative demands and also criteria to deal with the well-known threat of fire on-board self-unloading ships, an Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) examination discovered.
“The fire on board Iron Chieftain demonstrates how the effectiveness of a shipboard response to a fire depends primarily on the ability to detect the fire at an early stage and quickly extinguish it at the source,” claimed ATSB Chief Commissioner Greg Hood.
“Iron Chieftain’s self-unloading system was not equipped with a fire detection or fixed fire-extinguishing system in the C-Loop space, but nor was it required to be.
“This highlights the lack of adequate international standards or regulations for dedicated fire detection and fixed fire extinguishing systems in cargo handling spaces of self-unloading bulk carriers.”
The ATSB’s examination record additionally keeps in mind that the preliminary emergency situation action by the staff, specifically quiting the conveyor belts, assisted the fire’s very early advancement as warm might not dissipate.
“Following ignition, the combination of high fuel loads in the form of rubber conveyor belts in the C-Loop space and airflow from the vertical design of the loop and its ventilation fans, meant the fire quickly established itself and travelled along the C-Loop’s rubber conveyor belt system to the ship’s exterior to the deck discharge boom and set it alight,” claimed Hood.
In enhancement, warm from the fire in the C-Loop room triggered thermal tension, breaking and also contortion to the nearby hefty gas oil containers, launching extra gas for the fire and also boosting its strength and also intricacy.
“The ATSB recommends the introduction and improvement of international standards for suitable fire detection and fixed fire-extinguishing systems in the cargo handling spaces of self-unloading bulk carriers and the introduction of standards for the fire resistant properties of their conveyor belts,” Hood claimed.
“The absence of these measures has been a contributing factor in at least three major shipboard fires over a 25‑year period, including Iron Chieftain.”
Hood claimed the ATSB invites the dedication by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) and also Lloyd’s Register to come close to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and also the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) specifically, to highlight the safety and security problem pertaining to the insufficiency of fire safety and security criteria or policies for self-unloading system rooms.
“Nonetheless, the ATSB is recommending that AMSA formally raise the safety issue with the IMO to initiate safety action aimed at addressing the risk of fire in the cargo handling spaces of self-unloading bulk carriers due to the inadequacy of the current associated standards and regulations,” he claimed.
Separately, the examination keeps in mind that while the drivers of Iron Chieftain had actually determined the fire threat in the ship’s freight dealing with room because of the absence of fire discovery and also taken care of snuffing out systems, specifically in the C-Loop room, concerning 5 years previously, the avoidance and also recuperation actions it implemented were not enough to alleviate the threat.
In action to the Iron Chieftain fire, the driver’s moms and dad business, the CSL Group, started a fire threat reduction task throughout its international fleet of self-unloading mass service providers to boost fire discovery and also reductions innovation, examining its firefighting plan and also establishing minimal fire safety and security criteria for very early fire discovery and also reductions at the ship style and also develop phase.
Finally, the ATSB additionally determined a safety and security problem associating with Fire and also Rescue New South Wales’s aquatic firefighting ability along with various other safety and security variables associated with the irregular conduct of ship’s drills and also Port Kembla’s emergency situation action strategies.
